

S. No.		Pg. No.
<b>Session 1 Women, Equality &amp; Law</b>		
1.	Kapur, R. & Cossman, B., <b>“Gender Equality Redux”</b> , National Law School Journal, vol. 16 no.1, (2022) pp. 59-65.	
2.	Dhingra, A., <b>“Gender Discourses and the Making of the Indian Constitution”</b> , Indian Journal of Gender Studies, vol. 29 no.1, (2021) pp. 33-54.	
3.	Bhatnagar, S., <b>“Equality in the time of Religion: Gender Justice in the Supreme Court”</b> , The Indian Advocate: Journal of the Bar Association of India, Vol. XLII (2018) pp. 144-162.	
4.	Centre for Reproductive Rights, <b>“Securing Reproductive Justice in India: A Casebook”</b> , Center for Reproductive Rights and Centre for Constitutional Law, Policy, and Governance, National Law University, Delhi (2019).	
5.	Dev, S., <b>“Gender Justice in India: A Feminist Jurisprudential Perspective”</b> , Tattva Journal of Philosophy, vol. 10, no.1, (2018) pp. 69-88.	
6.	Dev, M., <b>“Fetal Impairment &amp; Reproductive Justice”</b> , The Indian Advocate: Journal of the Bar Association of India, Vol. XLII (2018) pp. 235 - 251.	
7.	Walby S. et. al., <b>“Conceptualising Violence And Gender”</b> in THE CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT OF VIOLENCE Bristol University Press - Policy Press (2017) pp. 31-55.	
8.	Kapur, R., <b>“Gender Equality”</b> in Choudhary et. al (Eds.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. Oxford University Press, 742-755 (2016).	
9.	Karp, A. <i>et.al.</i> <b>“Unheard and Uncounted: Violence against Women in India”</b> , Small Arms Survey (2015) <a href="http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep10686">http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep10686</a>	
10.	<b>Case Law</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>X v. Union of India</b>, 2023 INSC 919 [Medical termination of pregnancy after 24 weeks]</li> <li>● <b>Aishat Shifa v. The State of Karnataka</b>, (2023) 2 SCC 1 [Prohibition of wearing of Hijab in educational institutions - Matter referred to larger bench]</li> <li>● <b>X v. Health and Family Welfare Department</b>, 2022 SCC Online SC 1321 [Unmarried women’s right to safe abortion]</li> <li>● <b>Indian Young Lawyers Association &amp; Ors. v. The State of Kerala</b>, (2019) 11 SCC 1 [Custom prohibiting entry of women in their menstruating years in the Sabarimala temple held to be unconstitutional]</li> <li>● <b>Joseph Shine v. Union of India</b>, (2019) 3 SCC 39</li> </ul>	

	<p>[The Court decriminalised adultery, striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Shakti Vahini v. Union of India</b>, (2018) 7 SCC 192 [Right to marry person of one's own choice - Duty of authorities and courts to protect persons from honour killing and honour crimes perpetrated by khap panchayats, community or clan]</li> <li>● <b>X v. Union of India</b>, (2017) 3 SCC 458 [Termination of pregnancy after 20 weeks to save life of pregnant women - when permissible]</li> <li>● <b>Shayara Bano v. Union of India</b>, (2017) 9 SCC 1 [Practice of <i>talaq-e-biddat</i> held to be unconstitutional]</li> <li>● <b>Independent Thought v. Union of India</b>, (2017) 10 SCC 800 [Exception 2 to Section 375, Indian Penal Code, 1860 read down to provide that non-consensual intercourse with wife below 18 years would amount to rape]</li> <li>● <b>Budhadev Karmaskar (1) v. State of W.B.</b>, (2011) 11 SCC 538 [Sex Workers have a right to live with dignity as per Article 21]</li> <li>● <b>Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.</b>, (2010) 9 SCC 218 [Criteria for determining value of services of mother/wife rendered to the family]</li> <li>● <b>Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration</b>, (2009) 9 SCC 1 [Necessity of consent of mentally challenged pregnant woman in case of medical termination of pregnancy.]</li> <li>● <b>Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn. of India</b>, (2008) 3 SCC 1 [Protective discrimination &amp; gender equality - Provision prohibiting employment of women in establishments serving liquor or intoxicating drugs perpetrated sexual differences and restricted a citizen's right to be considered for employment, which was a facet of the right to livelihood.]</li> <li>● <b>Railway Board v. Chandrima Das</b>, (2000) 2 SCC 465 [Rape violates women's right to life under Article 21]</li> <li>● <b>Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India</b>, (1999) 2 SCC 228 [Inequality on grounds of sex, where the rights of a mother, as a natural guardian of the minor were cognizable only 'after' the father.]</li> <li>● <b>Phoolan Devi v. Shekhar Kapoor</b>, 1994 SCC OnLine Del 722 [Right of privacy is implicit in the right to life and property — Even the public figures are entitled to privacy — No person has a right to hurt the feelings of a person by depicting her in a film in total disregard to her privacy by showing her being raped, paraded nude etc even if the agreement permitting to make improvement in the story authorised by her.]</li> </ul>	
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Session 2 Applying a Gender Perspective in Adjudication		
1.	Supreme Court of India, “ <b>Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes</b> ” (2023) <a href="https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/LU/04092023_070741.pdf">https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/LU/04092023_070741.pdf</a>	
2.	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “ <b>Handbook for the Judiciary on Effective Criminal Justice Responses to Gender-based Violence against Women and Girls</b> ”, (2019)	
3.	Bajpai, G.S. & Mendiratta, R., “ <b>Gender Notions in Judgments of Rape Cases: Facing the Disturbing Reality</b> ”, 60 JILI (2018) 298	
4.	International Commission of Jurists, “ <b>Bangkok General Guidance for Judges on Applying a Gender Perspective in Southeast Asia</b> ” (2016)	
5.	<p><b>Case Law</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai</b>, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1494 [Use of Two-finger test deprecated- held to be regressive and invasive. Any person conducting such test shall be guilty of misconduct.]</li> <li>● <b>Aparna Bhat v. State of MP</b>, 2021 SCC OnLine 230 [Gender Stereotyping in judgment writing- Need for sensitivity &amp; use of appropriate language; guidelines for granting bail in sexual assault cases]</li> <li>● <b>Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P.</b>, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 343 [Intersectional oppression and how it needs to be addressed]</li> <li>● <b>Ramphal v. State of Haryana</b>, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1993 [Factum of compromise is irrelevant in rape and sexual assault cases]</li> <li>● <b>Nipun Saxena v. Union of India</b>, (2019) 2 SCC 703 [Keeping in view the social object of preventing the victims or ostracising of victims, it would be appropriate that in judgments of all the courts i.e. trial courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court the name of the victim should not be indicated.]</li> <li>● <b>Laxmi v. Union of India</b>, (2014) 4 SCC 427 [Directions for preventive measures &amp; compensation in cases of acid attack ]</li> <li>● <b>Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra</b>, (2013) 6 SCC 770 [Award of Compensation under Section 357 CrPC to Victim]</li> <li>● <b>The State Of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh &amp; Ors</b>, (1996) 2 SCC 384 [Deprecation of approach of casting a stigma on the character of the prosecutrix]</li> <li>● <b>Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India &amp; Ors.</b>, (1995) 1 SCC 14 [Compensation for victims irrespective of conviction of the offender]</li> </ul>	

Session 3 Women in the Workplace		
1.	Banerjee, M. <b>“Gender Equality and Labour Force Participation: Mind the Gap”</b> 4(1) ANTYAJAA: Indian Journal of Women and Social Change, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2019) pp. 113 – 123.	
2.	Justice Gautam Patel, <b>“Shattering Glass Ceilings on The Bar and on The Bench”</b> , The Indian Advocate: Journal of the Bar Association of India, Vol. XLII (2018) pp. 27 - 36.	
3.	Khaitan, N., <b>“The Firm Women -A Perspective on Indian Women Working in Law Firms”</b> , The Indian Advocate: Journal of the Bar Association of India, Vol. XLII (2018) pp. 170-177	
4.	International Labour Organisation, <b>“ACT/EMP Research Note: Breaking Barriers: Unconscious Gender Bias in the Workplace”</b> (2017)	
5.	Stainback, K. <i>et. al.</i> , <b>“Women In Power: Undoing or Redoing the Gendered Organization?”</b> Gender and Society, Vol. 30, No. 1 (February 2016), pp. 109-135	
6.	Bobbitt-Zeher, D. <b>“Gender Discrimination At Work: Connecting Gender Stereotypes, Institutional Policies, and Gender Composition of Workplace”</b> , Gender and Society , December 2011, Vol. 25, No. 6 (December 2011), pp. 764-786	
7.	Smith, A.E. <b>“On The Edge of a Glass Cliff: Women in Leadership in Public Organizations”</b> , Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 (FALL 2015), pp. 484-517.	
8.	<p><b>Case Law</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Kavita Yadav v. Ministry of Health &amp; Family Welfare Department</b>, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1067 [Maternity benefits - applicability beyond duration of contractual employment]</li> <li>● <b>Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal</b>, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1088 [Child Care/ Maternity benefits in case of relationships not fitting into the popular notion of family]</li> <li>● <b>Secretary Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya</b>, (2020) 7 SCC 469 [Gender equality in employment opportunities - entitlement of women officers in armed forces to permanent commissions]</li> <li>● <b>Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja</b>, (2020) 13 SCC 1 [Equality of opportunity &amp; gender equality- Claim of women naval officers to permanent commissions]</li> <li>● <b>Charu Khurana v. Union of India</b>, (2015) 1 SCC 192 [Gender discrimination in film industry - Bye-laws of association which prohibit employment of women held to be violative of the right to life and livelihood &amp; right to equal access to employment (Articles 14, 15 &amp; 21)]</li> <li>● <b>K. Kalaiselvi v. Chennai Port Trust</b>, 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 811 [Entitlement to maternity leave in case of child born through surrogacy]</li> </ul>	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll)</b>, (2000) 3 SCC 224 [Maternity leave entitlement extends to women employed on casual basis or muster roll basis.]</li> <li>● <b>Vishaka &amp; Ors v. State of Rajasthan &amp; Ors</b>, (1997) 6 SCC 241 [Guidelines for protection and enforcement of rights of women against sexual harassment in the workplace]</li> <li>● <b>Uttarakhand Mahila Kalyan Parishad v. State of U.P.</b>, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 480 [Parity in employment of men and women teachers]</li> <li>● <b>Neera Mathur v. LIC</b>, (1992) 1 SCC 286 [Discharge of employee for concealing pregnancy in the duration of the hiring process. LIC advised to delete columns seeking information which are personal &amp; which modesty and self-respect may preclude from disclosing.]</li> <li>● <b>Mackinnon Mackenzie &amp; Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D'Costa</b>, (1987) 2 SCC 469 [Disparity in wages between male and female stenographers for similar work held to be discriminatory]</li> <li>● <b>Air India v. Nergesh Meerza</b>, (1981) 4 SCC 335 [Provision of compulsory retirement on the event of first pregnancy is violative of Article 14 ]</li> </ul>	
9.	<b>Suggested Reading</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Mclaughlin, H. <i>et.al.</i>, <b>“The Economic And Career Effects Of Sexual Harassment On Working Women”</b> Gender and Society, Vol. 31, No. 3 (June 2017), pp. 333-358</li> </ul>	
<b>Session 4</b>		
<b>Matrimonial Issues &amp; Gender Justice</b>		
1.	Goswami, G.K. & Goswami, S., <b>“Live-In Relationships: Social Myths, Legal Realities and the Way Forward”</b> , (2021) 7 SCC J-25	
2.	Kapoor, R. <b>Decriminalisation of Adultery, the Indian Experience and Experiment : How Much Shine in the Joseph Shine Verdict?</b> , (2020) 5 SCC J-25	
3.	Kumar, V. <b>Matrimonial Property Law in India: Need of the Hour</b> , 57 JILI 500 (2015)	
4.	Ariplackal, R. & George, T.S., <b>“Psychological Components for Marital Distress and Divorce in Newlywed Indian Couples”</b> , Journal of Divorce & Remarriage, Vol. 56 No. 1 (2015) pp. 1-24.	
5.	Basu, S. <b>“Spoils of Marriage: Irretrievable Breakdown and Matrimonial Property in the Law Commission of India Reports”</b> , 6 JILS 22 (2014-15)	
6.	Trivedi, P.K. & Singh, S., <b>“Fallacies of a Supreme Court Judgment Section 498A and the Dynamics of Acquittal”</b> , Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 49, No.52, (2014) pp. 90-97	

7.	Ray, P., <b>“Leaving Home, Leaving Rights”</b> , 4.1 JILS (2012-13) 81	
8.	Sankaran, K., <b>“Family, Work and Matrimonial Property: Implications for Women and Children”</b> in Parashar, A., & Dhanda, A. (Eds.). (2009). REDEFINING FAMILY LAW IN INDIA (1st ed.). Routledge India. pp. 258-281	
9.	Saxena, P.P., <b>“Matrimonial Laws and Gender Justice”</b> , 45 JILI (2003) 335	
10.	<p><b>Case Law on Marriage</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Joseph Shine v. Union of India</b>, (2019) 3 SCC 39 [The Court decriminalised adultery, striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860]</li> <li>● <b>Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M.</b>, (2018) 16 SCC 368 [Right to marry a person of one’s choice is an integral part of Article 21]</li> <li>● <b>Nandakumar v. State of Kerala</b>, (2018) 16 SCC 602 [Freedom to marry or enter into live-in relationship with person of one’s own choice]</li> <li>● <b>Shakti Vahini v. Union of India</b>, (2018) 7 SCC 192 [Right to marry person of one’s own choice - Duty of authorities and courts to protect persons from honour killing and honour crimes perpetrated by khap panchayats, community or clan]</li> <li>● <b>Shayara Bano v. Union of India</b>, (2017) 9 SCC 1 [Practice of talaq-e-biddat held to be unconstitutional]</li> </ul>	
11.	<p><b>Case Law on Domestic Violence</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi</b>, (2022) 8 SCC 90 [Right to reside in shared household extends to foster children]</li> <li>● <b>S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru</b>, (2021) 15 SCC 730 [Overriding effect of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be construed to preclude all other competing remedies and protections under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005]</li> <li>● <b>Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja</b>, (2021) 1 SCC 414 [Requirements for premises to qualify as shared household]</li> <li>● <b>Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora</b>, (2016) 10 SCC 165 [Remedies under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 can be availed against female member and non-adults]</li> <li>● <b>Malathi Ravi v. B.V. Ravi</b>, (2014) 7 SCC 640 [S.13(1)(i-a) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955- Mental Cruelty - Mental cruelty and its effect cannot be stated with arithmetic exactitude. It varies from individual to individual, from society to society and also depends on status of the persons.]</li> <li>● <b>Vajresh Venkatray Anvekar v. State of Karnataka</b>, (2013) 3 SCC 462 [Assault on women offends her dignity and cannot be accepted as a social norm. Wife beating leading to suicide- what impact the assault has on the woman will depend on the circumstances in each case.]</li> </ul>	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade</b>, (2011) 3 SCC 650 [Relative under Section 2(q) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is not restricted to male relatives, and includes female relatives as well.]</li> </ul>	
12.	<p><b>Case Law on Section 498A</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>K.V. Prakash Babu v. State of Karnataka</b>, (2017) 11 SCC 176 [Mental cruelty in Section 498-A Expln (a) has nothing to do with demand of dowry. It is associated with mental cruelty that can drive a woman to commit suicide and is dependent on the conduct of the person concerned, the milieu and strata from which the persons come.]</li> <li>● <b>Bhaskar Lal Sharma v. Monica</b>, (2014) 3 SCC 383 [Cruelty under S. 498A has a twofold meaning. While instances of physical torture would be plainly evident from the pleadings, conduct which has caused or is likely to cause mental injury would be far more subtle.]</li> <li>● <b>Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar</b>, (2014) 8 SCC 273 [All state governments directed to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under S. 498A IPC is registered, but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters flowing from S. 41 CrPC.]</li> <li>● <b>Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat</b>, (2013) 10 SCC 48 [Cruelty under S. 498A IPC includes both physical and mental cruelty. Mental cruelty varies from person to person, depending upon the intensity and degree of endurance. The mere fact that the husband has developed intimacy with another woman during the marriage and failed to discharge his marital obligations as such would not amount to cruelty under the Explanation to Section 498A IPC.]</li> <li>● <b>Kantilal Martaji Pandor v. State of Gujarat</b>, (2013) 8 SCC 781 [Proof of Cruelty under S.498A (a) IPC- Evidence when not admissible due to finality of finding on charge under S. 306- Letter written by deceased to police station complaining of ill-treatment and mental cruelty would be relevant only under S. 32(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Evidence admissible under S. 32(1) cannot be admitted to prove offence under S. 498A.]</li> <li>● <b>Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand</b>, (2010) 7 SCC 667 [Allegations of harassment by husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and rarely or never visited the place of residence of the complainant wife are required to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection.]</li> <li>● <b>Neelu Chopra v. Bharti</b>, (2009) 10 SCC [For lodging a proper complaint mere mentioning of relevant sections and language of those sections is not sufficient. Particulars of offence committed by each accused and role played by them in committing that offence need to be stated.]</li> <li>● <b>Mohd. Hoshan v. State of A.P.</b>, (2002) 7 SCC 414 [Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact. The impact of complaints, accusations or taunts on a</li> </ul>	

	<p>person amounting to cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity of the individual, social backgrounds, environment, education etc. Mental cruelty varies from person to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the degree of courage or endurance to withstand such mental cruelty. Each case has to be decided on its own facts to decide whether cruelty has been established or not.]</p>	
<p>13.</p>	<p><b>Case Law on Maintenance</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Rajnish v. Neha</b>, (2021) 2 SCC 324 [Remedy of maintenance is a measure of social justice as envisaged under the Constitution to prevent wives and children from falling into destitution and vagrancy. Held, there is a need for framing guidelines under Article 142 of the Constitution for ensuring timely disposal of applications seeking maintenance.]</li> <li>● <b>Swapan Kumar Banerjee v. State of W.B.</b>, (2020) 19 SCC 342 [Delay of 1 year in claim for maintenance - Delay will make no difference because it is for the wife to decide when she wants to file a petition for maintenance. She may have felt comfortable with the earnings she had upto that time or may have not wanted to precipitate matters till she was contesting the divorce petition by filing a claim for maintenance. Mere fact that wife did not file a petition for grant of maintenance during pendency of matrimonial proceedings is no ground to hold that she is not entitled to file such petition later on. Maintenance- sufficiency of income of wife - Held, it is for the husband to lead evidence to show sufficiency of income of wife. In absence of such evidence no presumption can be raised that the wife is earning sufficient amount to support herself.]</li> <li>● <b>Kaushalya v. Mukesh Jain</b>, (2020) 17 SCC 822 [Interim Maintenance pending computation of income of husband- Case remanded by High Court- Held, appellant wife cannot be left in the lurch without any order of maintenance pending an uncertain future date when remanded proceedings would be decided. Keeping in mind that the application for maintenance remained pending for nearly a decade, there would be serious miscarriage of justice if an order of remand simpliciter is passed without providing any financial security to the appellant. Order of trial court for grant of maintenance shall operate as an ad interim direction and arrears payable to the appellant shall be paid in six monthly instalments.]</li> <li>● <b>Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand</b>, (2019) 13 SCC 796 [Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Act or omission defining domestic violence is broad enough to include all aggrieved persons including a not legally wedded wife and those not entitled to maintenance under S. 125 Cr.P.C. Under PWDVA the victim would be entitled to more relief than what is contemplated under S. 125 Cr.P.C.]</li> <li>● <b>Kamala v. M.R. Mohan Kumar</b>, (2019) 11 SCC 491 [Long cohabitation between man and women led to presumption of marriage entitling maintenance to the woman and children born to them.]</li> </ul>	



	<p>Broad and expansive interpretation should be given to term 'wife' under S. 125 Cr.P.C.]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Ajay Kumar v. Lata</b>, (2019) 15 SCC 352 [Direction for interim maintenance is confirmed in case of shared household in ancestral joint Hindu family property and joint business between brother and deceased husband.]</li> <li>● <b>Nutan Gautam v. Prakash Gautam</b>, (2019) 4 SCC 734 [Direction of High Court compelling wife to choose only one forum, either under S.125 Cr.P.C. or Ss. 12/19 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 to seek maintenance, held to be impermissible.]</li> <li>● <b>Shailja v. Khobbanna</b>, (2018) 12 SCC 199 [Capability of wife to earn is not a sufficient reason to reduce maintenance awarded. Capable of earning and actually earning are two different requirements]</li> <li>● <b>Sanjay Kumar Sinha v. Asha Kumari</b>, (2018) 5 SCC 333 [Maintenance granted under S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would supercede maintenance granted under S. 125 Cr.P.C.]</li> <li>● <b>Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury nee Nandy</b>, (2017) 14 SCC 200 [Power of court to modify or vary discharge permanent alimony or maintenance due to change in circumstances.]</li> <li>● <b>Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain</b>, (2017) 15 SCC 801 [Grant of maintenance <i>pendete lite</i> - Discretionary exercise of jurisdiction while granting alimony <i>pendente lite</i> should be judicious and can neither be arbitrary nor capricious but should be guided on sound principles of matrimonial law, and to be exercised within the statutory provisions having regard to the object of the Act. While determining quantum of interim maintenance, Court must have regard to income of the parties, and is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes claim has no independent income sufficient to support him/her or to meet necessary expenses. Financial position of wife's parents as well as education of wife who could support herself is inconsequential.]</li> <li>● <b>Jaiminiben Hirenghai Vyas v. Hirenghai Rameshchandra Vyas</b>, (2015) 2 SCC 385 [Grant of Maintenance - whether from the date of application or from date of order. Held, direction of High Court that maintenance should be paid only from date of order cannot be upheld particularly when the High Court has not given any reason why it has not directed maintenance from the date of application for maintenance. Need for reasoned orders- it is neither appropriate nor desirable that a court simply states that maintenance should be paid from either date of application or date of order without giving proper reasons for the same. Ss. 125 &amp; 354(6) must be read together. As per S. 354(6) Cr.P.C. the court should record reasons in support of order passed by it in both eventualities.]</li> <li>● <b>Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse</b>, (2014) 1 SCC 188</li> </ul>	
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	<p>[Maintenance of second wife - Held, in view of the fact that husband duped the second wife by not revealing the fact of his earlier marriage, the husband cannot deny maintenance to the second wife as he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Giving purposive construction to S. 125 Cr.P.C and applying mischief rule, the woman would be treated as a legally wedded wife for the purpose of maintenance under S. 125 Cr.P.C.]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan</b>, (2014) 12 SCC 636 [Maintenance under S.125 Cr.P.C. to Muslim women - Application under S. 125 Cr.P.C. not to be restricted to the date of divorce. Filing of application under S. 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 after divorce for grant of mahr and return of gifts would not disentitle the wife to sustain her application under S. 125 Cr.P.C.]</li> <li>● <b>Pyla Mutyalamma v. Pyla Suri Demudu</b>, (2011) 12 SCC 189 [Validity of a marriage cannot be a ground for the refusal of maintenance if the other requirements of S. 125 Cr.P.C. are fulfilled. S. 125 proceeds on the basis of a de facto marriage and not marriage de jure. The nature of proof of marriage required for a proceeding under S. 125 need not be strong or conclusive since the object of S. 125 is to afford a swift remedy.]</li> <li>● <b>Chand Patel v. Bismillah Begum</b>, (2008) 4 SCC 774 [Wife and children from irregular (fasid) marriage are entitled to maintenance unless the marriage has been declared void.]</li> <li>● <b>Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri</b>, (2000) 3 SCC 180 [A woman after divorce is entitled to claim maintenance from former husband if she cannot provide for herself and remains unmarried. Husband remains under a statutory duty and obligation to provide maintenance to his former wife. The fact that the divorce was based on desertion is no ground to deny maintenance. Though the marital relations came to an end by the divorce, the respondent continues to be a ‘wife’ within the meaning of S. 125 Cr.P.C. on account of Explanation (b) to sub-section (1).]</li> <li>● <b>Danial Latifi v. Union of India</b>, (2001) 7 SCC 740 [There is no discrimination where the State provides a scheme for maintenance and prevention of vagrancy for a particular group, and the scheme is equally or more beneficial than that provided in the earlier general then prevailing.]</li> </ul>	
14.	<p><b>Case Law on Matrimonial Property</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Jaidev Rajnikant Shroff v. Poonam Jaidev Shroff</b>, (2022) 1 SCC 683 [If wife decides to shift to any property falling within the parameters of being “similar” to accommodation of husband, or otherwise, husband directed to pay rent of said premises. Held, “similar” does not mean “identical”.]</li> <li>● <b>Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma</b>, (2020) 9 SCC 1 [Daughter’s right in coparcenary property - daughter who is alive on the date of enforcement of the amendment i.e. 9-9-2005 becomes a</li> </ul>	

	<p>coparcener on the said date irrespective of whether she was born before the amendment]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Chowdhury</b>, (2016) 2 SCC 705 [Entrustment of <i>Stridhan</i> to husband - Held, <i>stridhan</i> property is the exclusive property is the exclusive property of the wife. On proof that she entrusted the property or dominion over the <i>stridhan</i> property to her husband or any other member of the family, there is no need to establish any further special agreement to establish that the property was given to the husband or any other member of the family. It is always a question of fact in each case as to how the property came to be entrusted to the husband or family member. The concept on continuing offence gets attracted from the date of deprivation of <i>stridhan</i>. Neither the husband nor the other family members can have any right over the <i>stridhan</i>, they remain the custodians.]</li> <li>● <b>Bobbili Ramakrishna Raja Yadad v. State of A.P.</b>, (2016) 3 SCC 309 [Dowry/<i>stridhan</i> if placed in custody of husband or in-laws, they would be deemed to be trustees of the same.]</li> <li>● <b>Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar</b>, (1985) 2 SCC 370 [The concept of <i>stridhan</i> property of a woman is not abolished by Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. A pure and simple act of entrustment of the <i>stridhan</i> to the husband does not constitute a partnership]</li> </ul>	
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<b>Session 5</b> <b>Emerging Horizons of Women-Centric Jurisprudence in India</b>		
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1.	Huber, A. <b>“A shadow of me old self: The Impact of Image-Based Sexual Abuse in a Digital Society”</b> , International Review of Victimology Volume 29, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 199-216	
2.	Boethius, S. <i>et. al.</i> , <b>“The Double Edged Sword – Abused Women’s Experiences of Digital Technology”</b> , European Journal of Social Work, Vol. 26, No. 3, (2023), pp. 506-518.	
3.	Sarkar, T., <b>“Privacy Through the Ages : India's Privacy Jurisprudence in Gender and Sexuality Rights”</b> , 12.2 JILS (2021) 53	
4.	Harris, B., & Vitis, L., <b>“Digital Intrusions: Technology, Spatiality and Violence against Women”</b> , Journal of Gender-Based Violence, Vol. 4, No.3, (2020), pp. 325-341.	
5.	Atrey, S., <b>“Lifting as We Climb: Recognising Intersectional Gender Violence in Law”</b> , Oñati Socio-legal Series Vol. 5, No.1512 (2015), pp. 1519-20.	
6.	Halder, D., <b>“Cyber Stalking Victimization of Women: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current Laws in India from Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudential Perspectives”</b> , TEMIDA Vol. 18 No, 3-4 (2015), pp. 103-130.	
7.	Gurumurthy, A. & Chami, N., <b>“Digital Technologies and Gender Justice in India - An Analysis of Key Policy and Programming Concerns”</b> April 2014	
8.	<b>Case Law</b>	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Mrs. X v. Union of India</b>, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2361 [Directions &amp; recommendations to MEITY &amp; Police to deal with cases of non-consensual sharing of intimate image]</li> <li>● <b>Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P.</b>, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 343 [Intersectional oppression and how it needs to be addressed]</li> <li>● <b>Sunil Sachdeva v. Owner of Domain Name WWW.CJR7.COM</b>, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11168 [The right to know may invade another's right to privacy and breach of confidentiality; and the former right has to be harmonized with the need for personal privacy, confidentiality of information and effective governance. Distinction is required to be made between “something which is of interest to the public” and “something which is in public interest”. The interest of the public in private matters would repudiate and directly traverse the protection of privacy and there is a right to shield oneself from unwarranted access to one's personal information and to protect facets of reputation, honor etc. associated with the right to privacy.]</li> <li>● <b>Shreya Singhal v. Union of India</b>, (2015) 5 SCC 1 [Constitutional Validity of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000]</li> </ul>	
9.	<p><b>Suggested Reading</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Kimberle Crenshaw, “<b>Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color</b>” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 6 (1991), pp. 1241-1299</li> </ul>	